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We  use  a  large  sample  of  Kansas  Farm  Management  Association  farms  for  eight  different 
crop/practice combinations (dryland and irrigated corn, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat) for 1994 
through 2006 to evaluate the determinants of relative yield performance and explore the ability 
of financial variables to account for some of the remaining unexplained variation. Our hypothesis 
is that more financially sound farms should be able to implement better production techniques, 
thus have better yields. We further test whether decoupled payments can be used to enhance 
yield performance. Our hypothesis is that payments may be used to boost investment in inputs or 
equipment that can lead to better yields. Our results suggest this could be the case. 
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1.  Introduction 
The  Federal  Agricultural  Improvement  and  Reform  (FAIR)  Act  of  1996,  or  1996  farm  bill, 
modernized U.S. farm policy, challenged by the rising costs of farm support programs and by the 
lack of compatibility between increased spending on agricultural support and the multilateral 
commitments  made  under  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  to  limit  trade-distorting 
agricultural  support.  The  replacement  of  the  more  traditional  instruments  of  support  by 
decoupled payments was based on the idea that if decoupled payments do not distort market 
incentives, they should not distort production or trade. But the literature has identified several 
potential “coupling” mechanisms that suggest theory and practice are not in accord, such as 
wealth  effects  and  their  impact  on  risk  aversion  and  labor  choices,  credit  constraints,  and 
expectations about future revisions of policy. Empirically, the effects of decoupled payments 
have been studied on variables such as cropland allocation, time allocation between on- and off-
farm work and leisure, and land rents and values.
1 
But  decoupled  payments  need  not  affect  farmers’  decisions  solely  at  the  extensive 
margin. They may also affect how resources are used at the intensive margin, leading to different 
application rates of inputs such as pesticides, fertilizer or water. Farmers may choose to invest 
the additional financial resources into better production methods, such as improved technology 
or  other  inputs,  thereby  increasing  productivity.  There  is  very  little  work  published  in  the 
economics literature on the determinants of crop yield performance. Except for Goodwin et al. 
(2002), who found that farmers’ experience in growing the crop or alternative crops improves 
yield performance, no other studies analyze the individual characteristics of farms and farmers 
that may lead some farms to have greater productivity than others. Aside from the biological 
                                                 
1 For a thorough review of coupling mechanisms and empirical studies see Bhaskar and Beghin (2007). 3 
constraints that cause yields to vary from farm to farm, or from field to field within a farm, 
understanding the farm-level individual characteristics that cause yields to differ is important, 
and this importance may be linked to the increased tendency for farm support to be awarded 
through  decoupled  payments.  With  the  creation  of  Production  Flexibility  Contract  (PFC) 
payments and the elimination of deficiency payments, the 1996 Farm Bill provided farmers with 
payments that were independent of market prices. Together with the increasing willingness of the 
U.S. government to forestall future ad hoc assistance programs, the effects of these two policies 
could be thought of as increasing farmers’ risk exposure, as deficiency payments helped offset 
low prices and disaster assistance programs helped offset low yields, low prices, or both.  
Our goal is to revisit the determinants of yield performance at the farm level as studied by 
Goodwin et al. (2002) and explore the ability of additional variables to account for the remaining 
unexplained variation. In particular, we observe whether the financial characteristics of the farms 
may help explain differing yield performances; among these characteristics we include farmers’ 
wealth  and  debt  to  asset  ratio,  along  with  government  payments.  Moreover,  we  investigate 
whether decoupled payments may be used to enhance yields at the farm level. Our hypothesis is 
that these payments may be used to boost investment in inputs or equipment that can lead to 
better yields. We use a large sample of Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) farms 
for eight different crop/practice combinations (dryland and irrigated corn, sorghum, soybeans, 
and wheat) for 1994 through 2006. These farms are full-time commercial operations, which are 
mainly farms with gross sales exceeding $100,000. The KFMA farms represent, according to 
Albright (2001), the various farming areas and farm types in Kansas. Our access to historical 
farm level data allows us to overcome some of the problems related with our inability to observe 
so many factors that should influence yield performance at the farm level, such as the experience 4 
of the operator or the soil-water characteristics of the farm. Our econometric techniques involve 
the use of ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects (FE), and random effects (RE).  
We  proceed  as  follows.  The  next  section  discusses  the  factors  that  affect  yield 
performance at the farm level. Along with the empirical framework and econometric approach, 
the following section presents the data used. The results of the estimation are then discussed. 
Some concluding remarks are finally offered.  
2.  Factors affecting yield performance 
Crop  yields  depend  on  a  number  of  factors,  whether naturally  occurring,  like  the  soil-water 
properties of the field or rainfall, or management induced, like the variety selected or the amount 
of fertilizer applied. These factors, and the degree of their impact, vary from year to year and 
from field to field, and they also interact with each other in space and time, which can minimize 
or cause a more extreme impact from a single factor. Consider the role of water. The importance 
of water in the soil is clear as one thinks about how spring rains can delay planting or when crops 
are endangered by summer droughts. And water interacts with the characteristics of the soil to 
determine the availability to crops of soil nutrients, fertilizers, and pesticides over the course of 
the growing season. To see this, think about how the movement of water through soil determines 
the amount of fertilizer or pesticide/herbicide that remains available to crops in contrast to how 
much is carried downward to the groundwater. For example, a sandy soil holds less water for the 
crops (thereby reducing yield in a dry year) than a clay soil, and it also has lower nutrient levels. 
But the clay soil holds the water more tightly in smaller pores, making drainage slower and the 
water less readily available to plant roots.
2  
                                                 
2 For an overview of the interaction between water and soil characteristics see Trautman et al. (1985). The sources 
of yield variation on a field were taken from this source. 5 
Other naturally occurring factors that influence yield performance include the weather, 
the physical and chemical properties of the soil, the slope and geographical orientation of the 
site, and the susceptibility to pest infestations. In terms of weather, the amount, frequency and 
distribution of precipitation, the temperature, the solar radiation, and the wind may significantly 
affect the yield performance of a crop. The physical and chemical properties of the soil include 
the texture, topsoil depth, nutrient availability, ph, and organic matter. These are related to the 
aforementioned  soil-water  relationships,  which  are related  to  drainage,  soil  depth,  and  water 
holding capacity. The topography and direction of a site (North, South, East or West) include 
characteristics  as  soil  erosion,  temperature,  and  machinery  operations.  Finally,  crop  pest 
infestations include weed, insects and diseases.  
Along  with  naturally  occurring  factors,  management  practices  may  also  affect  crop 
yields. In broad terms, these factors include the choice of crop inputs, the field history, and past 
cultural practices and/or mistakes. An example of a performance improving choice of crop inputs 
is the adoption of plants bred to include resistance to diseases and insects, tolerance to heat and 
drought, reduction in the time to crop maturity, greater yield, and better agronomic quality. The 
field  history  is  concerned  with  the  historical  use  of  herbicide  or  pesticide,  and  with 
fertilizer/manure inputs. Poor management practices such as the inappropriate use of pesticides 
and  monocropping  could  induce  resource  degradation  that  injures  yield  performance.  These 
could  be  considered  as  cultural  practices  and/or  mistakes,  which  also  include  crop  rotation, 
tillage  and  compaction,  manure  applications,  land  leveling,  ditch  cleaning,  misapplication  of 
nutrients or pesticides etc. Other management induced factors influencing  yield performance 
include  those  studied  by  Goodwin et  al.  (2202).  Using  KFMA  over  the  1980  through  1998 
period, the authors found that more years of experience in growing a crop tended to be correlated 6 
with higher relative yields, as did superior historical performance on other crops.  
Finally,  note  that  differing  yields  may  happen  for  completely  different  reasons,  and 
indeed factors that limit or boost yields will vary from field to field, and from place to place 
within a field. And what may be a yield-boosting factor for one crop or in a given year does not 
necessarily have the same effect on a different crop or in the next year. 
3.  Empirical framework and data 
Given  the  naturally  occurring  factors  that  influence  yield  performance,  proper  management 
should be able to minimize the influence of yield-decreasing factors and enhance the influence of 
yield-boosting factors. For a given crop/practice combination, a reduced form yield performance 
equation can be defined as  
(1)  { } , ict ict ict Yield = Natural Management  
where the subscripts i, c, and t index the ith farm in county c at time t,  ict Yield  denotes crop 
yields,  ict Natural  is a vector of naturally occurring factors, and  ict Management  is a vector of 
management induced factors.  
But yields cannot be compared across time and space without normalization. A common 
means of normalization is to divide the individual farmer’s yield by the average yield for the 
county in which the farm is located. We use the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) 
county average  yields in the normalization. This procedure deals with the deterministic time 
effects associated with yield trends while at the same time picking up some of the effects of 
localized weather events. It also specifically addresses the issue of farmers in areas with higher 
than  average  yields  exhibiting  this  pattern  as  well.  For  a  given  crop/yield  combination, 
normalized yields are given by  7 
(2)  ˆ / ict ict ct y Yield Yield =  
where  ˆict y  is the normalized yield for the ith farm in county c at time t and  ct Yield  is the NASS 
county average yield for all producers in the ith farm’s county. Normalized yields, which we 
represent as a percentage of the county average yield, can be used to compare yield patterns 
across different crop/practice combinations and years. We now turn to the variables that should 
be  included  in  the  estimating  equation.  These  are  variables  that  are  included  in  the 
ict Management  vector. Our discussion of the estimation methodology explains how we deal 
with the unobserved variables that are included in the  ict Natural  vector. 
Successful crop production should depend on careful management of the soil, water, and 
chemicals, so that plant needs are met as they occur in the growing season. For example, we 
hypothesize that greater per acre expenditures on seed and chemicals (fertilizer and herbicide) 
should  be  correlated  with  better  yield  performance.  Likewise,  investment  in  machinery  and 
equipment should increase productivity. We also expect farm size to be correlated with yield 
performance. In order to see this, consider the association between the adoption of newer and 
improved  technology  and  farm  size.  One  reason  farms  have  been  growing  is  to  make  more 
economical use of machines capable of covering more ground with less labor. And larger farms 
can typically get volume discounts on inputs such as chemicals and seed. Conversely, larger 
farms  may  have  lower  average  yields  due  to  decreasing  marginal  productivities.  Indeed,  the 
inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity is an “old and puzzling empirical 
regularity” (Assunção and Braido 2007). 
Like Goodwin et al. (2002), we hypothesize that yield performance may be affected by 
the diversification of the farm. We consider three measures of diversification. The first measure 
connects the performance in growing crops to that of growing livestock. Given the considerable 8 
differences in expertise required by these practices, we hypothesize that farmers who receive 
greater sales shares from livestock will exhibit less proficiency in producing crops, and vice-
versa. The authors found that farm operations with a significant share of sales coming from 
livestock production tended to have lower relative crop yields. 
The second measure is related to the dispersion of expertise over too many enterprises. 
While we expect dispersion of the farmers’ attention over too many activities to hinder yield 
performance, so that more highly diversified farms could face lower yields on individual crops, 
we also expect some degree of expertise to be transferable across crops, so that an individual 
farmer with a good performance on one crop could have high expected yields on a different crop. 
For example, a producer with a historical above-average performance in soybeans would be 
expected  to  also  have  an  above-average  performance  in  corn.  Goodwin  et  al.  found 
diversification over enterprises yielded varied results. They also found a positive effect on the 
historical  performance  in  alternative  crops.  The  authors  also  considered  the  presence  of 
knowledge spillovers, the idea being that farmers in counties with more production in recent 
years tended to have higher relative yields. While the results did not indicate the presence of 
those neighboring effects, we include all these measures of diversification, relative performance 
in alternative crops, and learning from neighbors in our estimating equation. We also account for 
the farmers’ production experience in the crop/practice under analysis by observing the average 
number of years the crop was grown in the previous four years.  
Our third measure of diversification includes the hypothesis of a relationship between 
relative crop performance and the relevance of farming activities in overall income. Intuitively, 
farmers  whose  greatest  share  of  income  comes  from  off-farm  activities  should  have  less 
incentives to invest in crop yield-boosting methods than farmers whose greatest share (or sole 9 
source) of income comes from the farm. The logic underlying this regressor is similar to that of 
the potential negative impact of diversification over too many enterprises on yield performance. 
Finally,  and  even  though  we  cannot  observe  the  quality  of  the  land  in  the  farm,  we 
hypothesize that farms with better land quality will put a greater share of this land into crop 
production. Alternatively, we expect farms with higher land quality to be likely to have less 
waste and set-aside than other farms.  
For  a  given  crop/practice  combination,  the  estimating  equation  for  the  ith  farmer  in 
county c is given by 
(3)  
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where  ict Seed ,  ict Chemical ,  and  ict Machinery   measure  per  crop  acre  expenditures  on  seed, 
chemicals  (herbicide  and  fertilizer),  and  machinery  investment,  respectively,  ict Size   is  the 
number of operated acres,  ict Cropacres  is the number of acres devoted to the crop/practice under 
analysis,  ict Livestock   is  the  share  of  livestock  sales  in  total  sales,  ict Diversification   is  a 
Herfindahl index of diversification over enterprises calculated from sales shares,  ict Owner  is the 
is the share of farm income in total (farm and off-farm) income,  ict Meancrops  measures the 
farmer’s performance on other crops,  ict Experience  is the number of years the farmer produced 
the crop/practice in question over the past four years,  ct Countyacres  is the average number of 
acres in the county where the farm is located devoted to the crop/practice over the past four 
years, and  ict Cropsacresshare  is the proportion of total acres engaged in crop production.  
The  last  two  terms  in  the  equation  correspond  to  the  error  term,  where  ict u   is  the 10 
idiosyncratic term and  ct η  are the unobserved factors that cause yield performance to vary from 
year to year in each county. Following Moulton (1986) the covariance is matrix is estimated by 
allowing each county-year group to have a different and unrestricted covariance structure but 
assumes errors are uncorrelated across groups. Additionally, the estimating equation includes 
year dummy variables and county dummy variables. After including these regressors, a large 
variation in yield performance remains unexplained, since so many characteristics that determine 
it, such as rainfall or nutrient availability are unobserved. Indeed, in spite of our inclusion of 
ict Cropsacresshare  to represent overall land quality, none of the factors in the  ict Natural  vector 
appear. So, we specify the estimating equation with a farm-specific fixed effect  i f .  
We further hypothesize that the logic underlying the importance of size can be extended 
to  the  financial  characteristics  of  the  farm.  In  principle,  more  financially  sound  farms,  with 
greater  net  worth  and/or  smaller  debt  to  asset  ratios,  should  be  able  to  implement  better 
production  practices  and,  in  turn,  generate  better  yields.  Including  wealth  in  our  estimating 
equation further allows us to account for differing risk responses and general wealth effects. 
Another  component  of  the  financial  characteristics of  the  farm  is  government  payments.  By 
providing farms with additional liquidity, we expect payments to allow investment in production 
to occur and credit constraints to be less binding. Hence, these payments can be invested in 
technology or inputs, and we expect them to have a positive influence on yield performance.  
We thus expand our estimating equation to include the financial characteristics of the 
farm, along with government payments, so that  
(4)  
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9
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13
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where  ict Wealth  is the net worth of the farm,  ict DAR  is the debt to asset ratio, and  ict GP  is the 
amount of government payments received. In our analysis we further address the potential for 
decoupled payments to distort production via improved yield performance for a subset of farms 
by replacing  ict GP  by the amount of decoupled payments received by farmers for the 1996-2001 
period (when the FAIR Act was in place).
3 
We use KFMA data collected over the thirteen year period from 1994 to 2006. Our panel 
contains 23,255 observations on 3,273 farms that operated more than 50 acres. Because we do 
not impose that all farms grow all four crops and their different practices, we have a smaller 
number of farms which we observe over the period for each crop/practice combination. For the 
farms that are present for the 13 years in the sample, we always observe more farms growing the 
dryland practice. Overall, in terms of relative performance, the farms in our sample appear to 
have similar yields to the counties where they are located. The farms operated an average of 
1,763 acres, 68.85 percent of those as cropland, and they devoted more acres to dryland crops, 
growing an average of 91 acres of dryland corn, 151 acres of dryland sorghum, 182 acres of 
dryland soybeans, and 361 acres of dryland wheat, while growing 60 acres of irrigated corn, 5 
acres of irrigated sorghum, 20 acres of irrigated soybeans, and 16 acres of irrigated wheat.  
The average farm had a net worth of about $440.47 thousand, and $224.61 thousand in 
debt. To avoid double counting we subtracted government payments from farmers’ wealth. Non 
farm income was a source of revenue for the farms in our sample, of about $15.66 thousand. And 
while on average this number was smaller than that of net farm income, $40.75 thousand, the 
ratio of net farm income to total, non- and net farm income, was only of 0.6844.  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the data used in our estimation.  
                                                 
3  Note  that  because  decoupled  payments  are  based  on  historical  acres  and  yields,  larger  payments  should  be 
associated with size, so these effects may be difficult to disentangle. 12 
Overall, in terms of relative performance, the farms in our sample appear to have similar 
yields to the counties where they are located. The farms operated an average of 1,763 acres, 
68.85 percent of those as cropland, and they devoted more acres to dryland crops, growing an 
average  of  91  acres  of  dryland  corn,  151  acres  of  dryland  sorghum,  182  acres  of  dryland 
soybeans, and 361 acres of dryland wheat, while growing 60 acres of irrigated corn, 5 acres of 
irrigated sorghum, 20 acres of irrigated soybeans, and 16 acres of irrigated wheat.
4  
The average farm had a net worth of about $440.47 thousand, and $224.61 thousand in 
debt. To avoid double counting we subtracted government payments from farmers’ wealth. Non 
farm income was a source of revenue for the farms in our sample, of about $15.66 thousand. And 
while on average this number was smaller than that of net farm income, $40.75 thousand, the 
ratio of net farm income to total, non- and net farm income, was only of 0.6844.  
                                                 
4 Since we are using an unbalanced panel where many farms do not grow all the crop/practices, our summary 
statistics undervalue the farms’ acreages. 13 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of farms (per year) 23,255 1,789 535 1,137 2,237
Operated Acres, Total (1,000) 23,255 1.76 1.40 0.05 15.83
Share of Crops in Total Operated Acres 23,255 0.6885 0.2777 0.0034 1.0000
Wealth ($1,000) 23,255 440.47 501.10 -794.82 8,722.76
Total Liabilities ($1,000) 23,255 224.61 277.39 0.00 6,957.17
Debt to Asset Ratio 23,255 0.3848 0.3602 0.0000 11.1993
Government Payments ($1,000) 23,255 27.02 33.07 0.00 582.38
Net Farm Income ($1,000) 23,255 40.75 78.50 -2,465.68 1,706.14
Non Farm Income ($1,000) 23,255 15.66 21.48 -75.31 379.08
Seeds (per 1,000 crop acres) ($1,000) 23,255 0.08 1.07 -5.32 87.76
Chemical (per 1,000 crop acres) ($1,000) 23,255 0.27 2.84 -3.41 132.15
Machinery (per 1,000 crop acres) ($1,000) 23,255 122.78 166.82 0.00 12,730.45
Ownership Interest 23,255 0.6845 5.8491 -273.3977 241.7512
Diversification 23,083 0.5192 0.2033 0.0000 0.8670
Livestock Share of Sales  23,083 0.2774 0.3309 0.0000 1.0000
Normalized Yields,Irrigated Corn  3,861 98.39 21.67 0.00 185.12
Normalized Yields, Dryland Corn 4,490 100.47 40.74 0.00 384.25
Normalized Yields, Irrigated Sorghum 937 94.98 36.81 0.00 251.89
Normalized Yields, Dryland Sorghum 11,889 101.03 32.65 0.00 338.97
Normalized Yields, Irrigated Soybeans 1,994 102.29 27.88 0.00 210.00
Normalized Yields, Dryland Soybeans 7,500 101.75 36.56 0.00 383.81
Normalized Yields, Irrigated Wheat 1,695 98.71 37.99 0.00 393.48
Normalized Yields, Dryland Wheat 19,198 100.27 27.97 0.00 337.50
Acres, Irrigated Corn (1,000) 23,255 0.06 0.19 0.00 4.08
Acres, Dryland Corn (1,000) 23,255 0.09 0.20 0.00 3.34
Acres, Irrigated Sorghum (1,000) 23,255 0.01 0.04 0.00 2.66
Acres, Dryland Sorghum (1,000) 23,255 0.15 0.22 0.00 5.44
Acres, Irrigated Soybeans (1,000) 23,255 0.02 0.08 0.00 1.36
Acres, Dryland Soybeans (1,000) 23,255 0.18 0.32 0.00 4.13
Acres, Irrigated Wheat (1,000) 23,255 0.02 0.08 0.00 2.26
Acres, Dryland Wheat (1,000) 23,255 0.36 0.42 0.00 4.54
County Acreage, Irrigated Corn (1,000) 17,838 13.58 20.52 0.10 123.72
County Acreage, Dryland Corn (1,000) 19,016 7.33 9.20 0.10 72.38
County Acreage, Irrigated Sorghum (1,000) 14,729 2.70 3.66 0.10 25.74
County Acreage, Dryland Sorghum (1,000) 22,444 31.57 24.75 0.23 100.78
County Acreage, Irrigated Soybeans (1,000) 18,072 3.42 4.24 0.10 21.41
County Acreage, Dryland Soybeans (1,000) 20,497 25.76 24.85 0.10 106.01
County Acreage,Irrigated Wheat (1,000) 9,777 8.64 13.25 0.10 78.66
County Acreage, Dryland Wheat (1,000) 23,255 95.99 79.98 0.64 452.08
Years Produced, Irrigated Corn  23,255 1.18 1.64 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Dryland Corn   23,255 1.90 1.69 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Irrigated Sorghum  23,255 0.74 1.27 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Dryland Sorghum  23,255 2.92 1.51 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Irrigated Soybeans  23,255 0.92 1.43 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Dryland Soybeans   23,255 2.47 1.72 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Irrigated Wheat   23,255 0.82 1.36 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Dryland Wheat  23,255 3.49 1.11 0.00 4.00
Mean other crops, Irrigated/Dryland Corn 23,255 0.9117 0.3356 0.0000 6.7728
Mean other crops, Irrigated/Dryland Sorghum 23,255 0.9098 0.3372 0.0000 6.7728
Mean other crops, Irrigated/Dryland Soybeans 23,255 0.9078 0.3082 0.0000 2.2112
Mean other crops, Irrigated/Dryland Wheat 23,255 0.8528 0.4396 0.0000 10.9809
 
The measure of ownership interest is one of three measures of farm diversification used. 14 
The other two measures include the share of livestock sales to total sales of the farm and the 






diversification h = −∑  
where 
2
k h  represents the share of total farm sales accounted for by enterprise k (and enterprises 
include the eight crop/practices under analysis and the different livestock raised in the farm). The 
advantage of this representation is that the diversification index is growing with the degree of 
diversification of the farm. The average farm had a livestock share of sales of 27.74 percent, and 
the sales diversification index was 0.5192 (note that if sales are completely concentrated in one 
enterprise, this index takes value 0, while approaching 1 the more diversified the farm). 
The  number  of  years  growing  the  crop  in  the  previous  four  years  and  the  mean 
performance in other crops capture the effect of experience in farming. On average, the farmers 
in our sample grew dryland wheat in the previous 3.49 years, dryland sorghum in the previous 
2.92 years, dryland soybeans in the previous 2.47 years, and dryland corn in the previous 1.90 
years. Again, there was greater experience in growing the dryland practice of these four crops. 
The relative performance in alternative crops was calculated as in Goodwin et al. (2002), where 
the relative yield measures were normalized by their respective means and then averaged across 
all  other  crops  for  the  preceding  four  years.  This variable  did  not  include  the  relative  yield 
performance on the other practice of the crop, so that, for example, for dryland corn, the mean of 
other crops included all sorghum, soybeans, and wheat production, but not irrigated corn. 
4.  Empirical results 
We begin our econometric approach by estimating equations (3) and (4) using simple, pooled 
OLS.  This  estimator  is,  however,  biased  and  inconsistent  if  the  unobserved  heterogeneity  is 15 
correlated  with  any  of  the  regressors.  For  that  reason,  we  use  FE  methods  to  purge  the 
unobserved heterogeneity from the equations, and estimate the slope parameters using OLS on 
the transformed data. This transformation leaves the term  ct η  unaffected, so that we continue to 
assume that farms within a county-year “cluster” are correlated as a result of the unobserved 
cluster  effect,  and  errors  are  uncorrelated  across  year-county  clusters.  Alternatively,  if  the 
regressors  are  not  correlated  with  the  unobserved  heterogeneity,  we  can  exploit  the  serial 
correlation in the composite error,  i ct ict f u η + + , in a generalized least squares framework by 
using random effects analysis (Wooldridge 2002). Of course, if the model does not contain an 
unobserved effect, pooled OLS is efficient. We tested the presence of unobserved effects by 
using the Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test, which rejected the hypothesis of zero 
variance  of  the  unobserved  heterogeneity.  In  addition,  we  chose  between  the  FE  and  RE 
estimators by using a Hausman test. For both equations, the null hypothesis that the RE estimator 
is consistent and efficient was rejected for all the dryland crops and for all irrigated crops except 
sorghum at the 1 percent level of significance (10% in the case of irrigated wheat). Thus, we use 
FE methods to estimate the equations for all dryland crops and for irrigated corn, soybeans, and 
wheat, and use RE methods to estimate the equations for irrigated sorghum.  
Tables A.1 through A.8 (in the Appendix) report the results of estimating relative yield 
performance for the eight crop/practice combinations of corn, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat. 
Each table contains the results for a given crop/practice combination. The first four tables report 
the results for the dryland crops and the following four tables report the results for the irrigated 
crops. In each table, columns (1) through (5) report the results from estimating equation (3) and 
columns  (6)  through  (10)  report  the  results  from  estimating  equation  (4).  Each  equation  is 
estimated using OLS and panel data methods, FE or RE, using specifications that vary in the 16 
dummy variables included. Along with the parameter estimates and robust standard errors, the 
tables include the number of observations and the R
2 statistic; for the RE estimator, this statistic 
is the overall statistic. Finally, the last row in each table reports the p-value associated with the 
partial F-test for the joint significance of the additional three variables in equation (4). 
Overall, our results reveal that the effects of the different farm characteristics on relative 
crop yield performance are crop and practice specific. For example, under the FE estimator, 
relative  performance  in  other  crops  has  a  statistically  significant  positive  effect  on  relative 
dryland wheat yields, but a statistically significant negative effect on relative dryland sorghum 
yields; they do not affect the irrigated practice of these crops.  
Overall, expenditures on seed, chemicals, and machinery seem to play a small role in 
affecting  the  relative  yield  performance  of  these  crops.  These  effects,  along  with  varying 
between  crop  and  the  different  practices  within  each  crop,  are  also  very  dependent  on  the 
estimator  used.  For  example,  when  using  OLS,  greater  spending  on  seed  has  a  statistically 
significant  effect  solely  on  wheat  (both  practices),  but  this  effect  becomes  insignificant  for 
dryland wheat and positive for irrigated wheat when FE methods are used.  
When  we  take  unobserved  effects  into  account,  we  see  that  decreasing  marginal 
productivities matter for dryland sorghum and dryland wheat, where farm size has a statistically 
significant  negative  effect  on  yield  performance.  Across  both  equations  and  their  different 
specifications, larger farms have lower relative yields. For dryland sorghum, an additional 1,000 
operated  acres  decreases  relative  sorghum  yields  by  1.3  to  2.7  percentage  points,  while  for 
dryland wheat this increase in operated acreage brings about a decrease in relative wheat yields 
of between 1 to 1.7 percentage points. On the contrary, for irrigated soybeans, the relationship 
between farm size and productivity is significantly positive, and an additional 1,000 operated 17 
acres increase relative soybeans yields by 3.9 to 4.6 percentage points. The coefficient estimates 
on the number of acres devoted to each crop/practice further suggest this is the case.  
Like Goodwin et al. (2002), we find statistically significant negative coefficient estimates 
on the livestock share of sales. This is the case for all crops but corn and irrigated sorghum and 
soybeans;  except  for  dryland  sorghum,  the  magnitude  of  this  effect  is  greater  under  the  FE 
estimator. We also find that diversification over different enterprises has a significantly positive 
effect on relative yields; this occurs for sorghum, wheat, and irrigated corn, an effect that is 
slightly smaller under the FE estimator for dryland wheat. Ownership interest, while surprisingly 
significantly  negative  for  dryland  corn  in  equation  (4)  and  irrigated  sorghum  across  both 
equations, is significantly positive for irrigated wheat and not significant for the remaining crops.  
Experience also does not affect the four crops in the same fashion. For dryland wheat, 
better performance in alternative crops raises relative yields, the magnitude of this effect being 
greater  under  the  FE  estimator.  But  the  effect  is  opposite  for  dryland  sorghum,  where 
performance in other crops decreases relative yields, less so under the FE estimator. For some 
crops, the number of years growing the crop in question also has a negative effect on relative 
yields. No learning effects from neighbors are found except in dryland corn, irrigated soybeans, 
and dryland wheat, where larger average county acres cause relative yields to decrease. 
Our measure of overall land quality also yields mixed results. In general, OLS coefficient 
estimates suggest a greater share of operated acres used as cropland increases relative yields. But 
acknowledging the presence of unobserved effects renders these effects insignificant except for 
irrigated sorghum and for dryland sorghum. For the latter, a greater percentage of operated acres 
devoted to crops actually significantly decreases relative yields.  
Finally,  in  terms  of  the  financial  characteristics of  the  farms,  our  results  suggest  the 18 
following.  In  general,  if  unobserved  effects  are  not  accounted  for,  wealth  has  a  statistically 
significant positive effect on relative yields, although this effect is very small in magnitude. On 
the contrary, the debt to asset ratio has a negative effect on the relative yields of all crops and 
their  practices  except  for  irrigated  corn.  But  these  effects  are  rendered  insignificant  by  our 
acknowledgment  of  unobserved  effects,  except  for  irrigated  sorghum.  But  this  is  the  single 
crop/practice  combination  estimated  using  random  effects,  which  implicitly  assumes  the 
unobserved effects are uncorrelated with the regressors.
5 When taking unobserved effects into 
account,  government  payments  are  found  to  have  statistically  significant  positive  effects  on 
dryland  corn,  both  practices  of  sorghum,  and  dryland  wheat.  For  these  crops,  an  additional 
$1,000 in government payments increases relative yields by between 0.04 and 0.1 percentage 
points.  When  using  OLS,  however,  government  payments  have  a  statistically  significantly 
negative effect on relative irrigated corn and wheat yields. 
Overall, when using OLS, relative yields are significantly affected by farmers’ wealth in 
seven out of eight cases, by farmers’ debt to asset ratio in seven out of eight cases, and by 
farmers’  government  payment  receipts  in  five  out  of  eight  cases.  When  using  panel  data 
methods, these numbers fall to one and zero for the first two coefficients, and to four for the third 
coefficient.  These  results  suggest  that  government  payments  may  play  an  important  role  in 
affecting relative yield performance. When we take into account unobserved effects, we find 
statistically significant positive effects for sorghum, dryland corn, and dryland wheat. In terms of 
joint significance, the partial F-tests suggest we reject the hypothesis that all three coefficients 
are zero for the different crops and their practices when using OLS, and for corn, sorghum, and 
                                                 
5 When estimated using FE, the coefficient on wealth is statistically insignificant, whereas that of the debt to asset 
ratio is significantly positive. The coefficient on government payments is still statistically significantly positive and 
its  magnitude  unchanged.  The  partial  F-test  of  joint  significance  has  a  p-value  of  0.0014,  suggesting  these 
coefficient estimates are not equal to zero. 19 
dryland wheat when using panel data methods. 
The  finding  that  government  payments  affect  yield  performance  motivates  our  next 
analysis. Because decoupled payments may increase the liquidity or improve the collateral of the 
credit  constrained  farmer  in  a  manner  that  allows  investment  in  production  to  occur,  we 
hypothesize  this  investment  may  be  used  to  improve  production  methods.  The  goal  of  the 
following application is to observe whether decoupled payments affect yield performance. 
5.  AMTA payments and relative yield performance 
Decoupled  payments  were  introduced  in  the  FAIR  Act’s  Title  I,  known  as  the  Agricultural 
Market  Transition  Act  (AMTA).  This  act  authorized  the  distribution  of  PFC  payments  for 
contract commodities to eligible landowners or producers with eligible cropland. Authorized by 
emergency  legislation  in  1998-2001,  ad  hoc  Market  Loss  Assistance  (MLA)  payments  were 
made to recipients of PFC payments to compensate them for the loss of markets. MLA payments 
effectively doubled the  amount of payments  given to landowners or producers  for the  years 
1998-1999, and were labeled as “double AMTA” by Goodwin and Mishra (2006). This section 
estimates the impact of AMTA payments on relative crop yields.  
We estimate equation (4) for 1996 through 2001 (the period of the FAIR Act), using 
AMTA payments instead of total government payments. Because information is required on the 
farms’ historical acres and yields, a smaller set of farms is available for this application.  In 
particular, we can only use the subset of farms that reported production in the years 1986 through 
1988, since we base our estimation of the AMTA payments on these years’ average acres and 
yields (we follow Serra et al. (2005) in calculating these payments). Our data contain a total of 
7,187  observations.  The  highest  number  of  observations  in  a  year  occurs  in  1996  (1,307 
observations) and the lowest number occurs in 2001 (1,056 observations). We observe 882 farms 20 
over all the years in our sample; of these, we observe between 8 farms and 130 farms growing 
irrigated  crops  (the  bounds  correspond  to  sorghum  and  corn,  respectively)  and  between  241 
farms  and  608  farms  growing  dryland  crops  (the  bounds  correspond  to  corn  and  wheat, 
respectively). As before, we subtract the amount of AMTA payments from farmers’ wealth to 
avoid  double  counting.  Because  the  remaining  portion  of  payments  is  not  subtracted  from 
wealth, average wealth in this sample is greater than that of the previous application. Now, the 
average farmer has a wealth of about $520.66 thousand and $222.36 thousand in debt. In terms 
of normalized yields, those of irrigated corn, irrigated sorghum, dryland soybeans, and irrigated 
and dryland wheat are greater than in the previous sample, and those of dryland corn, dryland 
sorghum, and irrigated soybeans smaller than those in the previous sample.  
Tables A.9 through A.16 (in the Appendix) report the results of estimating relative yield 
performance for the eight crop/practice combinations of corn, sorghum, soybeans and wheat. 
Again, each table contains the results for a given crop/practice combination. Tables 5.11 through 
5.14 report the results for dryland corn, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat, and tables 5.15 through 
5.18 report the result for the irrigated practice of those crops, respectively. Once more, we use 
OLS and panel data methods, FE or RE, and use specifications that vary in the dummy variables 
included. Again, the last row in each table reports the p-value associated with the partial F-test 
for the joint significance of the net worth of the farm, the debt to asset ratio, and the amount of 
government  payments  received.  We  again  estimate  the  dryland  crops  and  irrigated  corn, 
soybeans, and wheat using FE and estimate irrigated sorghum using RE. 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the data used in our estimation. 
As before, we subtract the amount of AMTA payments from farmers’ wealth to avoid 
double  counting.  Because  the  remaining  portion  of  payments  is  not  subtracted  from  wealth, 21 
average wealth in this sample is greater than that of the previous application. Now, the average 
farmer  has  a  wealth  of  about  $520.66  thousand  and  $222.36  thousand  in  debt.  In  terms  of 
normalized yields, those of irrigated corn, irrigated sorghum, dryland soybeans, and irrigated and 
dryland  wheat  are  greater  than  in  the  previous  sample,  and  those  of  dryland  corn,  dryland 
sorghum, and irrigated soybeans smaller than those in the previous sample.  
Tables A.9 through A.16 (in the Appendix) report the results of estimating relative yield 
performance for the eight crop/practice combinations of corn, sorghum, soybeans and wheat. 
Again, each table contains the results for a given crop/practice combination. Tables 5.11 through 
5.14 report the results for dryland corn, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat, and tables 5.15 through 
5.18 report the result for the irrigated practice of those crops, respectively. Once more, we use 
OLS and panel data methods, FE or RE, and use specifications that vary in the dummy variables 
included. Again, the last row in each table reports the p-value associated with the partial F-test 
for the joint significance of the net worth of the farm, the debt to asset ratio, and the amount of 
government  payments  received.  We  again  estimate  the  dryland  crops  and  irrigated  corn, 
soybeans, and wheat using FE and estimate irrigated sorghum using RE.
6 
                                                 
6 We again judged the appropriateness of the FE estimator by a series of Hausman tests. The results were similar to 
those in the previous section. 22 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of farms (per year) 7,188 1,198 98 1,056 1,307
Operated Acres, Total (1,000) 7,188 1.78 1.37 0.05 11.06
Share of Crops in Total Operated Acres 7,188 0.6778 0.2701 0.0034 1.0000
Wealth ($1,000) 7,188 520.66 518.84 -568.61 5,924.80
Total Liabilities ($1,000) 7,188 222.36 272.92 0.00 4,313.30
Debt to Asset Ratio 7,188 0.3328 0.3219 0.0000 9.2463
Government Payments ($1,000) 7,188 19.12 18.09 0.00 329.80
Net Farm Income ($1,000) 7,188 45.46 83.32 -563.70 1,555.62
Non Farm Income ($1,000) 7,188 16.76 23.06 -8.46 309.21
Seeds (per 1,000 crop acres) ($1,000) 7,188 0.06 0.71 -0.18 28.01
Chemical (per 1,000 crop acres) ($1,000) 7,188 0.31 3.60 -0.34 132.15
Machinery (per 1,000 crop acres) ($1,000) 7,188 133.15 193.15 0.00 12,730.45
Ownership Interest 7,188 0.6982 5.7050 -257.6805 134.6589
Diversification 7,139 0.5229 0.2025 0.0000 0.8392
Livestock Share of Sales  7,139 0.2676 0.3273 0.0000 1.0000
Normalized Yields,Irrigated Corn  1,140 98.31 18.78 0.00 182.34
Normalized Yields, Dryland Corn 977 101.66 40.15 0.00 384.13
Normalized Yields, Irrigated Sorghum 259 94.30 38.07 0.00 251.89
Normalized Yields, Dryland Sorghum 3,822 102.55 28.90 0.00 232.31
Normalized Yields, Irrigated Soybeans 594 104.98 25.34 9.41 209.09
Normalized Yields, Dryland Soybeans 2,220 100.70 36.77 0.00 382.63
Normalized Yields, Irrigated Wheat 482 96.49 40.32 0.00 393.48
Normalized Yields, Dryland Wheat 5,972 99.99 27.70 0.00 306.67
Acres, Irrigated Corn (1,000) 7,188 0.06 0.17 0.00 2.63
Acres, Dryland Corn (1,000) 7,188 0.08 0.17 0.00 1.64
Acres, Irrigated Sorghum (1,000) 7,188 0.01 0.05 0.00 2.66
Acres, Dryland Sorghum (1,000) 7,188 0.17 0.23 0.00 4.49
Acres, Irrigated Soybeans (1,000) 7,188 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.94
Acres, Dryland Soybeans (1,000) 7,188 0.18 0.31 0.00 3.57
Acres, Irrigated Wheat (1,000) 7,188 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.37
Acres, Dryland Wheat (1,000) 7,188 0.35 0.40 0.00 4.20
County Acreage, Irrigated Corn (1,000) 5,667 13.58 21.28 0.10 123.72
County Acreage, Dryland Corn (1,000) 6,101 6.62 8.39 0.17 57.15
County Acreage, Irrigated Sorghum (1,000) 4,948 2.45 3.29 0.10 18.46
County Acreage, Dryland Sorghum (1,000) 7,188 34.82 25.81 0.23 100.78
County Acreage, Irrigated Soybeans (1,000) 5,646 3.15 3.96 0.10 20.73
County Acreage, Dryland Soybeans (1,000) 6,626 26.63 24.72 0.10 100.88
County Acreage,Irrigated Wheat (1,000) 3,132 8.27 12.93 0.10 76.44
County Acreage, Dryland Wheat (1,000) 7,188 98.17 82.49 0.64 452.08
Years Produced, Irrigated Corn  7,188 0.94 1.56 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Dryland Corn   7,188 1.61 1.68 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Irrigated Sorghum  7,188 0.43 0.98 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Dryland Sorghum  7,188 2.99 1.47 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Irrigated Soybeans  7,188 0.60 1.21 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Dryland Soybeans   7,188 2.32 1.77 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Irrigated Wheat   7,188 0.51 1.13 0.00 4.00
Years Produced, Dryland Wheat  7,188 3.52 1.08 0.00 4.00
Mean other crops, Irrigated/Dryland Corn 7,188 0.9781 0.2544 0.0000 5.3481
Mean other crops, Irrigated/Dryland Sorghum 7,188 0.9736 0.2542 0.0000 5.3481
Mean other crops, Irrigated/Dryland Soybeans 7,188 0.9656 0.2050 0.0000 2.0792
Mean other crops, Irrigated/Dryland Wheat 7,188 0.9469 0.4156 0.0000 10.9809
 
Our results suggest AMTA payments distort relative crop yields. When using OLS, a 
statistically significant positive effect is found in five out of eight cases: irrigated and dryland 23 
corn, dryland sorghum, irrigated soybeans, and dryland wheat. When panel data methods are 
used, these effects are only significant for dryland sorghum, where this effect is negative, and for 
irrigated wheat, where it is positive. The magnitude of these effects is crop and practice specific. 
When using OLS, an additional $1,000 in AMTA payments increases relative crop yields by 
0.03 percentage points for irrigated corn, by 0.18 percentage points for dryland corn, and by 
between 0.10 and 0.28 percentage points for dryland sorghum and soybeans. For dryland wheat, 
these values vary between 0.08 and 0.18 percentage points. When using FE, an additional $1,000 
in AMTA payments decreases dryland sorghum yields by 0.25 percentage points, although this 
effect  is  no  longer  significant  when  year  dummy  variables  are  included  in  the  estimating 
equation; irrigated wheat yields are increased by between 0.30 to 0.43 percentage points.  
As before, the effects of the other regressors on relative  yields are crop and practice 
specific. Again, both size, number of acres devoted to the crop/practice, and share of livestock 
sales have a negative impact on relative yields. And although the coefficient estimates are never 
statistically significant for the first variable for either estimator, those on the number of acres 
devoted to the crop/practice in question are significantly positive in two out of eight cases under 
OLS (irrigated corn and dryland sorghum) and significantly negative in three out of eight cases 
under FE (irrigated corn and both practices of soybeans). Those on the livestock share of sales 
are significantly negative in five cases under OLS (dryland sorghum, soybeans, and wheat, and 
irrigated  corn  and  sorghum)  and  two  cases  under  panel  FE  (dryland  corn  and  wheat). 
Diversification  overall  has  a  positive  effect  on  relative  yields,  although  some  coefficient 
estimates  are  negative  (but  statistically  insignificant).  The  estimate  for  the  Herfindahl  index 
coefficient is significant in three cases under OLS (irrigated sorghum and dryland sorghum and 
wheat) and in one case under panel data methods (dryland sorghum). Ownership interest raises 24 
relative crop yields for irrigated corn and wheat under both estimators and for irrigated soybeans 
under OLS, while decreasing relative irrigated sorghum yields under RE. In terms of experience, 
a better performance in other crops raises relative dryland wheat yields under both estimators, 
irrigated wheat under FE, and irrigated corn yields under OLS, while decreasing those of dryland 
sorghum under OLS and dryland corn under FE. The effect of more years growing the crop is 
also  not  clear:  a  statistically  significant  positive  effect  is  found  for  dryland  sorghum  and 
soybeans under OLS, but a negative effect is found for irrigated wheat under OLS and dryland 
corn under FE. Having more acres in the county devoted to growing the crop/practice in question 
tends to lower relative yields, as we find a significantly negative effect in six out of eight cases 
using OLS (irrigated corn, sorghum, soybeans and wheat, and dryland sorghum and wheat) and 
in  three  our  of  eight  cases  when  using  FE  (irrigated  corn,  soybeans,  and  wheat).  But  a 
statistically significant positive effect for dryland corn and sorghum is found when using FE.  
In terms of the other two variables that pertain to the financial  characteristics of the 
farms, wealth is found to have a statistically significant positive effect on relative crop yields 
only when using OLS, where it raises relative yields of irrigated corn, sorghum, and soybeans, 
and dryland sorghum, soybeans, and wheat.  But, as before, the magnitude of this effect is very 
small. The debt to asset ratio is also found to significantly affect relative yields when using OLS, 
lowering those of irrigated sorghum and soybeans, and those of dryland sorghum and wheat, 
while increasing those of irrigated corn. But when unobserved effects are taken into account, a 
single  statistically  significant  negative  effect  is  found  for  irrigated  soybeans.  When  taken 
together,  the  three  variables  included  in  the  set  of  financial  characteristics  of  the  farms,  net 
worth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments receipts, seem to be relevant in terms of 
explaining relative yield performance in six out of eight cases when using OLS (irrigated corn, 25 
sorghum and soybeans, and dryland sorghum, soybeans, and wheat), and in two out of eight 
cases when using panel data methods (irrigated and dryland sorghum). 
6.  Conclusions 
The question of which specific farm characteristics affect crop yields has been largely ignored by 
the economics literature. Yet, one would expect yields to be higher for farmers who are more 
skilled, who have a better knowledge of farming, or who have access to better technology or 
seeds. The goal of this section was to observe whether specific farm characteristics could explain 
relative crop yield performance. A variety of farm characteristics were treated as regressors in 
the econometric model of farm yields, including the financial characteristics of the farms, such as 
their wealth, debt to asset ratio, and the amount of government payments they received. As in 
Goodwin et al. (2002), we found that larger farms had lower relative yields, as did farms that had 
a greater share of sales coming from livestock. Wealthier farms also showed a tendency to have 
higher relative  yields, as did farms with greater government payments receipts; these effects 
were mainly found when using OLS methods. 
We  took  the  analysis  one  step  further  and  investigated  whether  decoupled  payments 
under  the  form  of  AMTA  payments  could  explain  differing  yield  performances.  Our  results 
suggest  this  is  the  case.  When  using  OLS,  AMTA  payments  are  found  to  have  statistically 
significant  positive  effects  on  both  practices  of  corn  and  soybeans,  dryland  sorghum,  and 
irrigated wheat; when using FE a statistically significant positive effect is found on dryland 
sorghum, whereas a negative effect is found on irrigated wheat. This finding has potentially 
important implications for agricultural trade policy, as the sole motivation for the distribution of 
these payments is that they do not distort production. While there is a large existing literature on 
the effects of AMTA payments on acreage, land prices, and labor choices, there are no existing 26 
studies on whether AMTA payments enhance yield performance. Our results seem to suggest 
there is the potential for decoupled payments to boost relative yields, thereby giving an unfair 
advantage to their recipients. This is likely to become an issue in upcoming WTO discussions 
over the distortionary effects of decoupled payments. 
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Table A.1. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for dryland corn 
Corn, Dryland











(0.7742) (0.741) (0.763) (1.306) (1.269) (0.746) (0.71) (0.743) (1.305) (1.27)











(0.1919) (0.186) (0.198) (0.153) (0.165) (0.177) (0.17) (0.181) (0.154) (0.168)























(0.5458) (0.569) (0.535) (2.195) (2.032) (0.707) (0.703) (0.68) (2.262) (2.143)











(4.8344) (4.755) (4.894) (10.631) (10.285) (4.794) (4.702) (4.879) (10.478) (10.262)



































(0.0988) (0.098) (0.091) (0.122) (0.143) (0.099) (0.099) (0.092) (0.122) (0.145)











(2.2428) (2.209) (2.184) (4.017) (3.77) (2.226) (2.206) (2.199) (3.968) (3.731)











(0.5829) (0.607) (0.576) (1.214) (1.145) (0.586) (0.598) (0.575) (1.204) (1.135)











(0.119) (0.098) (0.367) (0.443) (0.504) (0.118) (0.097) (0.361) (0.452) (0.5)


















(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)






(2.513) (2.566) (2.458) (8.088) (8.092)


















(5.809) (6.183) (5.728) (13.575) (12.905) (5.867) (6.355) (5.86) (14.004) (13.398)
Year dummies
County dummies







Yes Yes No No
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS FE OLS FE
(9) (10)
No Yes Yes No No
No No Yes No - No No Yes No -
No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
4,301 4,301 4,301 4,301 4,301 4,301






- - - - 0.2588 0.0800
0.1332 0.4564 0.4844
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the α= 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. F-test is the p-value associated with the partial F-test of joint significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments.  28 
Table A.2. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for dryland sorghum 
Soghum, Dryland











(0.2833) (0.288) (0.301) (0.369) (0.372) (0.274) (0.28) (0.281) (0.367) (0.369)











(0.107) (0.104) (0.093) (0.108) (0.105) (0.099) (0.095) (0.085) (0.109) (0.105)























(0.3533) (0.349) (0.33) (0.968) (0.963) (0.402) (0.398) (0.37) (1.02) (1.003)











(2.523) (2.482) (2.567) (2.605) (2.567) (2.47) (2.396) (2.52) (2.616) (2.56)



































(0.0517) (0.051) (0.051) (0.064) (0.063) (0.05) (0.049) (0.05) (0.064) (0.063)











(1.184) (1.19) (1.156) (1.309) (1.327) (1.161) (1.17) (1.145) (1.315) (1.326)











(0.5233) (0.517) (0.495) (0.799) (0.787) (0.516) (0.508) (0.491) (0.797) (0.786)











(0.0186) (0.018) (0.075) (0.07) (0.076) (0.018) (0.018) (0.074) (0.07) (0.075)


















(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)






(1.129) (1.126) (1.121) (3.198) (3.145)


















(3.0524) (3.159) (4.95) (6.138) (5.922) (3.086) (3.224) (5.026) (6.35) (6.08)
Year dummies
County dummies





OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No
No No Yes No - No No Yes No -
No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765 11,765
0.0451 0.0518 0.0978 0.4705 0.4766 0.0601 0.0680 0.1110
- 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - - 0.3086 0.0362
0.4709 0.4773
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the α= 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. F-test is the p-value associated with the partial F-test of joint significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 29 
Table A.3. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for dryland soybeans 
Soybeans, Dryland











(0.9592) (0.971) (-0.42) (1.003) (1.002) (0.962) (0.975) (0.966) (-0.17) (1)











(0.1659) (0.151) (0.145) (0.194) (0.193) (0.158) (0.139) (0.135) (0.194) (0.193)























(0.5701) (0.581) (0.577) (1.499) (1.496) (0.685) (0.666) (0.675) (1.563) (1.54)











(2.2065) (2.11) (2.038) (4.348) (4.301) (2.223) (2.126) (2.052) (4.4) (4.378)



































(0.0735) (0.07) (0.07) (0.067) (0.063) (0.072) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.063)











(1.6542) (1.649) (1.596) (2.122) (2.101) (1.638) (1.629) (1.582) (2.103) (2.092)











(0.6367) (0.612) (0.655) (1.05) (1.056) (0.637) (0.61) (0.653) (1.048) (1.055)











(0.0325) (0.032) (0.222) (0.172) (0.25) (0.033) (0.032) (0.219) (0.175) (0.249)


















(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)






(1.784) (1.861) (1.791) (4.6) (4.585)


















(4.5912) (4.74) (15.582) (9.503) (11.404) (4.681) (4.92) (15.569) (9.925) (11.853)
Year dummies
County dummies





OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No
No No Yes No - No No Yes No -
No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194 7,194
0.0320 0.0470 0.0824 0.4656 0.4716 0.0386 0.0547 0.0888
- 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - - 0.1883 0.2304
0.4666 0.4722
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the α= 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. F-test is the p-value associated with the partial F-test of joint significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments.  30 
Table A.4. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for dryland wheat 
Wheat, Dryland











(0.1581) (0.159) (0.155) (-0.41) (0.149) (0.156) (0.157) (0.151) (0.146) (0.148)











(0.0564) (0.056) (0.058) (0.062) (0.061) (0.057) (0.056) (0.058) (0.062) (0.061)























(0.268) (0.266) (0.237) (0.591) (0.583) (0.328) (0.315) (0.279) (0.623) (0.609)











(0.9052) (0.886) (0.814) (1.543) (1.513) (0.925) (0.912) (0.838) (1.543) (1.506)



































(0.0313) (0.032) (0.03) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.03) (0.031) (0.032)











(0.5724) (0.564) (0.533) (0.806) (0.763) (0.562) (0.553) (0.527) (0.795) (0.762)











(0.4596) (0.46) (0.456) (0.7) (0.705) (0.459) (0.46) (0.458) (0.7) (0.701)











(0.005) (0.005) (0.041) (0.036) (0.046) (0.005) (0.005) (0.04) (0.037) (0.045)


















(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)






(0.734) (0.726) (0.779) (1.18) (1.169)


















(2.443) (2.568) (3.952) (5.303) (6.373) (2.44) (2.619) (3.973) (5.41) (6.398)
Year dummies
County dummies





OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No
No No Yes No - No No Yes No -
No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
19,159 19,159 19,159 19,159 19,159 19,159 19,159 19,159 19,159 19,159
0.0188 0.0253 0.0767 0.3526 0.3614 0.0266 0.0335 0.0834
- 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - - 0.1657 0.0115
0.3530 0.3621
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the α= 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. F-test is the p-value associated with the partial F-test of joint significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 31 
Table A.5. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for irrigated corn 
Corn, Irrigated











(0.1338) (0.136) (0.181) (0.237) (0.22) (0.134) (0.138) (0.189) (0.236) (0.222)











(0.0499) (0.047) (0.047) (0.056) (0.054) (0.049) (0.046) (0.046) (0.057) (0.055)























(0.3402) (0.336) (0.332) (0.663) (0.639) (0.393) (0.391) (0.397) (0.649) (0.626)











(1.2262) (1.198) (1.134) (2.547) (2.498) (1.316) (1.447) (1.339) (2.665) (2.567)



































(0.1246) (0.136) (0.121) (0.092) (0.101) (0.126) (0.138) (0.122) (0.092) (0.101)











(1.2548) (1.238) (1.235) (1.434) (1.442) (1.252) (1.241) (1.231) (1.422) (1.438)











(0.6025) (0.594) (0.599) (0.613) (0.617) (0.598) (0.588) (0.593) (0.614) (0.618)











(0.0193) (0.02) (0.127) (0.104) (0.119) (0.02) (0.02) (0.126) (0.108) (0.12)


















(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)






(1.169) (1.164) (1.129) (2.897) (2.699)


















(4.6267) (4.852) (5.978) (7.492) (7.081) (4.636) (4.858) (5.833) (7.846) (7.343)
Year dummies
County dummies












(6) (7) (1) (2) (3)


























Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the α= 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. F-test is the p-value associated with the partial F-test of joint significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 32 
Table A. 6. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for irrigated sorghum 
Sorghum, Irrigated











(2.7164) (2.641) (2.767) (2.98) (2.908) (2.618) (-0.8) (2.68) (3.025) (2.893)











(0.8626) (0.936) (0.981) (0.784) (0.828) (0.852) (0.91) (0.984) (0.799) (0.834)























(0.9194) (0.939) (0.997) (1.211) (1.225) (1.181) (1.232) (1.302) (1.406) (1.425)











(13.2371) (13.777) (14.33) (13.578) (13.642) (13.091) (13.855) (14.637) (13.042) (13.309)



































(0.166) (0.172) (0.104) (0.12) (0.123) (0.157) (0.156) (0.107) (0.123) (0.127)











(4.667) (4.81) (4.842) (3.709) (3.743) (4.609) (4.753) (4.838) (3.639) (3.651)











(1.0964) (1.163) (1.137) (1.154) (1.216) (1.083) (1.139) (1.115) (1.147) (1.202)











(0.2258) (0.251) (0.64) (0.259) (0.298) (0.232) (0.259) (0.638) (0.261) (0.3)


















(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)






(2.127) (2.221) (2.263) (2.126) (2.048)


















(10.9584) (11.501) (16.481) (11.265) (11.286) (11.062) (11.931) (16.954) (11.597) (11.656)
Year dummies
County dummies








(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS RE OLS RE
(8) (9) (10)
No Yes Yes No No Yes No No
No No Yes No - Yes No




928 928 928 928 928 928 928 928
No
0.0288 0.0433 0.2047 0.0251 0.0364 0.0553 0.0726 0.2214
- 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 - - - - 0.0061 0.0045
0.0443 0.0592
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the α= 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. F-test is the p-value associated with the partial F-test of joint significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 33 
Table A.7. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for irrigated soybeans 
Soybeans, Irrigated











(0.8526) (0.805) (-2.18) (1.008) (1) (0.8) (0.748) (0.671) (1.013) (0.999)











(0.0572) (0.055) (0.054) (0.08) (0.073) (0.056) (0.054) (0.052) (0.081) (0.075)























(0.5647) (0.565) (0.654) (2.1) (2) (0.72) (0.691) (0.772) (2.083) (1.999)











(4.3697) (4.454) (3.931) (10.116) (9.021) (4.708) (4.9) (4.455) (10.162) (9.091)



































(0.3216) (0.338) (0.366) (0.395) (0.4) (0.339) (0.357) (0.379) (0.394) (0.396)











(2.8938) (2.845) (2.646) (3.383) (3.155) (2.808) (2.76) (2.575) (3.332) (3.171)











(0.5854) (0.587) (0.589) (0.985) (0.965) (0.596) (0.594) (0.595) (0.983) (0.956)











(0.1901) (0.189) (0.67) (0.635) (0.734) (0.187) (0.186) (0.663) (0.612) (0.727)


















(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)






(1.782) (1.744) (1.701) (3.776) (3.309)


















(7.0956) (7.826) (11.667) (15.864) (16.192) (7.146) (7.957) (11.678) (15.814) (16.257)
Year dummies
County dummies





OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No
No No Yes No - No No Yes No -
No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,950
0.0261 0.0602 0.1760 0.5086 0.5361 0.0425 0.0774 0.1897
- 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 - - - - 0.5564 0.4863
0.5096 0.5369
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the α= 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively.  34 
Table A.8. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for irrigated wheat 
Wheat, Irrigated











(1.6464) (1.555) (1.614) (1.791) (0.05) (1.603) (-1.96) (1.562) (1.8) (1.8)











(0.8119) (0.815) (0.852) (1.239) (1.219) (0.812) (0.815) (0.854) (1.241) (1.22)























(0.6508) (0.656) (0.728) (1.432) (1.45) (0.807) (0.804) (0.907) (1.428) (1.456)











(5.0558) (5.363) (5.728) (11.879) (11.839) (5.35) (5.673) (5.953) (11.981) (11.924)



































(0.1256) (0.132) (0.128) (0.149) (0.129) (0.133) (0.136) (0.134) (0.149) (0.13)











(3.0749) (2.935) (2.963) (3.882) (3.775) (3.061) (2.936) (2.966) (3.838) (3.79)











(1.0387) (1.075) (1.121) (2.085) (1.918) (1.049) (1.079) (1.136) (2.089) (1.914)











(0.0705) (0.064) (0.339) (0.298) (0.41) (0.071) (0.065) (0.34) (0.318) (0.416)


















(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)






(2.475) (2.509) (2.773) (3.766) (3.817)


















(8.8298) (8.378) (13.647) (19.975) (20.486) (8.973) (8.521) (13.747) (20.176) (20.18)
Year dummies
County dummies





OLS FE OLS FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No
No No Yes No - No No Yes No -
No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
1,682 1,682 1,682 1,682 1,682 1,682 1,682 1,682 1,682 1,682
0.0388 0.0668 0.1300 0.4516 0.4706 0.0455 0.0730 0.1369
- 0.0085 0.0115 0.0052 - - - - 0.9478 0.9211
0.4518 0.4708
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the α= 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. F-test is the p-value associated with the partial F-test of joint significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 35 
Table A.9. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for dryland corn (AMTA payments) 
Corn, Dryland






(1.086) (1.13) (1.137) (1.883) (1.817)






(0.173) (0.19) (0.181) (0.122) (0.144)













(1.313) (1.302) (1.559) (4.419) (4.285)






(9.419) (8.518) (8.049) (15.146) (14.192)




















(0.159) (0.161) (0.231) (0.304) (0.343)






(12.768) (12.125) (12.165) (19.43) (18.829)






(1.083) (1.021) (1.07) (2.239) (2.461)






(0.217) (0.201) (0.526) (0.692) (0.794)













(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.013)






(6.295) (6.364) (7.505) (15.318) (14.634)













(19.235) (18.153) (18.053) (34.348) (35.123)
Year dummies
County dummies







No Yes Yes No No
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No No Yes No -
913 913 913
No No Yes No No
0.0415 0.0741
913 913
0.1783 0.0970 0.3503 0.5950 0.8306
0.1860 0.5012 0.5198
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 
α=  0.01,  0.05  and  0.10  levels,  respectively.  F-test  is  the  p-value  associated  with  the  partial  F-test  of  joint 
significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 36 
Table A.10. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for dryland sorghum (AMTA payments) 
Soghum, Dryland






(0.594) (0.623) (0.624) (0.66) (0.705)






(0.133) (0.123) (0.109) (0.145) (0.139)













(0.493) (0.484) (0.464) (1.417) (1.403)






(2.42) (2.35) (2.341) (4.291) (4.376)




















(0.057) (0.054) (0.051) (0.064) (0.06)






(3.482) (3.519) (3.572) (4.814) (4.727)






(0.687) (0.673) (0.689) (1.423) (1.402)






(0.026) (0.025) (0.164) (0.159) (0.177)













(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005)






(1.748) (1.798) (1.981) (6.384) (6.309)













(5.436) (5.742) (9.234) (11.374) (11.457)
Year dummies
County dummies







No Yes Yes No No
(1) (2) (3) (4)







3,815 3,815 3,815 3,815
0.8033
0.5699 0.5770
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0745
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 
α=  0.01,  0.05  and  0.10  levels,  respectively.  F-test  is  the  p-value  associated  with  the  partial  F-test  of  joint 
significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 37 
Table A.11. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for dryland soybeans (AMTA payments) 
Soybeans, Dryland






(1.384) (1.375) (1.665) (-0.88) (1.847)






(0.228) (0.213) (0.212) (0.341) (0.348)













(1.105) (1.126) (1.155) (4.224) (4.238)






(3.565) (3.444) (3.788) (11.3) (10.92)




















(0.167) (0.171) (0.18) (0.253) (0.249)






(5.674) (5.839) (5.66) (8.906) (8.718)






(1.049) (1.02) (1.144) (2.682) (2.823)






(0.052) (0.052) (0.644) (0.43) (0.844)













(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.01) (0.01)






(2.852) (2.936) (2.786) (12.478) (12.213)













(8.633) (11.11) (50.107) (23.279) (36.151)
Year dummies
County dummies







No Yes Yes No No
(1) (2) (3) (4)







2,214 2,214 2,214 2,214
0.9541
0.5491 0.5514
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9853
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 
α=  0.01,  0.05  and  0.10  levels,  respectively.  F-test  is  the  p-value  associated  with  the  partial  F-test  of  joint 
significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 38 
Table A.12. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for dryland wheat (AMTA payments) 
Wheat, Dryland






(0.452) (0.452) (0.479) (0.42) (0.39)






(0.073) (0.072) (0.077) (0.077) (0.076)













(0.514) (0.503) (0.498) (1.173) (1.178)






(1.817) (1.8) (1.613) (3.276) (3.279)




















(0.038) (0.036) (0.034) (0.042) (0.043)






(1.249) (1.249) (1.173) (2.637) (2.607)






(0.915) (0.913) (0.922) (1.409) (1.435)






(0.008) (0.008) (0.099) (0.096) (0.113)













(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)






(1.307) (1.296) (1.372) (4.996) (4.975)













(4.454) (4.605) (6.789) (14.617) (16.677)
Year dummies
County dummies







No Yes Yes No No
(1) (2) (3) (4)







5,961 5,961 5,961 5,961
0.1444
0.4633 0.4660
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1606
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 
α=  0.01,  0.05  and  0.10  levels,  respectively.  F-test  is  the  p-value  associated  with  the  partial  F-test  of  joint 
significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 39 
Table A.13. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for irrigated corn (AMTA payments) 
Corn, Irrigated






(0.253) (0.22) (0.298) (0.324) (0.304)






(0.036) (0.029) (0.031) (0.059) (0.051)













(0.619) (0.589) (0.467) (1.168) (1.241)






(2.193) (2.233) (2.209) (3.955) (4.102)




















(0.196) (0.205) (0.157) (0.169) (0.165)






(4.423) (4.377) (5.012) (5.935) (5.672)






(1.001) (0.986) (1.067) (2.018) (1.901)






(0.028) (0.028) (0.158) (0.127) (0.189)













(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)






(2.459) (2.468) (2.559) (9.038) (8.168)













(7.085) (7.473) (21.285) (15.976) (16.428)
Year dummies
County dummies
























Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 
α=  0.01,  0.05  and  0.10  levels,  respectively.  F-test  is  the  p-value  associated  with  the  partial  F-test  of  joint 
significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 40 
Table A.14. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for irrigated sorghum (AMTA payments) 
Sorghum, Irrigated






(2.494) (-4.41) (7.582) (3.929) (3.446)






(4.034) (3.622) (8.812) (4.176) (3.601)













(2.05) (2.119) (1.985) (2.391) (2.379)






(27.776) (29.212) (31.345) (22.927) (24.005)




















(0.384) (0.41) (0.635) (0.412) (0.424)






(16.452) (17.42) (19.174) (13.97) (14.825)






(2.308) (2.373) (2.554) (2.248) (2.336)






(0.495) (0.517) (1.309) (0.653) (0.731)













(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)






(2.419) (2.474) (2.379) (2.052) (2.144)













(25.673) (26.703) (50.42) (25.209) (25.692)
Year dummies
County dummies


















0.0136 0.0131 0.0001 0.0425 0.0373
0.1356 0.1509
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 
α=  0.01,  0.05  and  0.10  levels,  respectively.  F-test  is  the  p-value  associated  with  the  partial  F-test  of  joint 
significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 41 
Table A.15. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for irrigated soybeans (AMTA payments) 
Soybeans, Irrigated






(0.659) (0.572) (0.756) (0.973) (0.95)






(0.061) (0.053) (0.051) (0.079) (0.079)













(1.097) (1.011) (1.227) (2.692) (2.895)






(8.474) (8.228) (8.879) (17.04) (16.952)




















(0.335) (0.275) (0.341) (0.502) (0.537)






(12.791) (12.706) (13.44) (18.393) (18.412)






(1.009) (0.877) (0.982) (2.263) (2.13)






(0.301) (0.302) (1.077) (1.102) (1.339)













(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)






(1.408) (1.342) (1.687) (12.35) (11.471)













(17.415) (16.376) (25.026) (30.772) (35.779)
Year dummies
County dummies







No Yes Yes No No
(1) (2) (3) (4)







579 579 579 579
0.8119
0.5651 0.5751
0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.9227
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 
α=  0.01,  0.05  and  0.10  levels,  respectively.  F-test  is  the  p-value  associated  with  the  partial  F-test  of  joint 
significance of wealth, debt to asset ratio, and government payments. 42 
Table A.16. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for irrigated wheat (AMTA payments) 
Wheat, Irrigated






(2.607) (2.799) (3.116) (3.013) (3.33)






(2.157) (2.254) (2.554) (6.139) (5.996)













(1.521) (1.543) (2.101) (5.702) (5.729)






(10.804) (10.944) (13.401) (28.7) (28.932)




















(0.397) (0.423) (0.386) (0.181) (0.221)






(9.599) (9.787) (9.438) (14.292) (13.915)






(2.178) (2.115) (2.429) (5.487) (5.756)






(0.119) (0.126) (1.038) (0.836) (1.041)













(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.015)






(2.305) (2.512) (7.446) (19.824) (20.49)













(19.474) (19.865) (74.953) (48.902) (51.903)
Year dummies
County dummies







No Yes Yes No No
(1) (2) (3) (4)







482 482 482 482
0.1013
0.5555 0.5629
0.4328 0.4422 0.4671 0.2336
 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Single, double and triple asterisks indicate significance at the 
α=  0.01,  0.05  and  0.10  levels,  respectively.  F-test  is  the  p-value  associated  with  the  partial  F-test  of  joint 
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